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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
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SUBJECT : NIE 11-5-54: Soviet Capabilities and Main
Lines of Policy through Mid-1959

1. Attached are revised scientific and military sections, additional paragraphs to section on courses of action, and the Conclusions.

2. A clean-up session on this estimate has been scheduled for 10:00 Tuesday, 25 May, in Room 146 South Building.

Paul A. Borel
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Acting Assistant Director
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DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ©
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 4/28/81 REVIEWER: 009256

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 May 1954

SUBJECT: NIE 11-5-54: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF
POLICY THROUGH MID-1959

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Soviet authority over the Satellites will almost certainly remain intact. There are potential conflicts of interest between the USSR and Communist China but we believe that during the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the relationship will predominate.

2. The USSR will probably maintain its policy of forced-draft economic expansion, with primary emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential, throughout the period. However, the high rates of economic growth achieved in the immediate postwar years have been declining; we believe that the annual rate for the next two years will be about six or 6.5 percent and in 1956-1959 about five or six percent. The average annual rate for the entire period of this estimate will be nearly double the long-range average annual rate for the US economy.

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3. We believe that if current economic programs are carried on as planned Soviet defense expenditures will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955. However, military procurement, even if it does not rise above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement of the armed forces in weapons, equipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

- a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
- b. Increase in the capability to deliver these weapons;
- c. Increase in the long-range submarine force;
- d. Improvement in weapons systems for air defense.

4. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. Bloc leaders will try to foster and exploit political weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist world. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying the political warfare needle dexterously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances without substantial risk of general war.

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5. The Kremlin may continue to follow generally along its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate. However, the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and of its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. On the other hand, we believe that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

6. Communist China, mainly because of the narrow margin of its available resources over minimum domestic requirements, is likely to be reluctant to undertake foreign enterprises involving substantial

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risks of general war. However, recent Communist successes in Indochina may predispose the Chinese Communists to press their advantage in Southeast Asia. If all or most of Indochina should fall under Communist control without the open intervention of Chinese Communist military forces having been required, the Chinese Communist leaders might feel that they could safely make strenuous efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections. In the absence of effective and united non-Communist resistance, both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders might take greater risks in this area of the world than in any other, not only because of the comparative vulnerability of Southeast Asia to political and military pressure but even more because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies concerning Far Eastern policy.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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19 May 1954

SUBJECT: NIE 11-5-54: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF
POLICY THROUGH MID-1959

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet
strategic policy through mid-1959.

THE ESTIMATE

I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND BELIEFS

1. The regime now in power in the USSR, or any that is likely
to succeed it, almost certainly will continue for the indefinite
future to consider its basic objective to be the consolidation and
expansion of its own power, internally and externally. In pursuing
this policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage ultimately:
(a) the elimination of every world power center capable of competing
with the USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all parts of the world;
and (c) Soviet domination over all other Communist regimes.

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6. We believe that whatever conflicts for power or differences respecting policy may develop within the ruling group, they are unlikely during the period of this estimate to affect the stability of the regime or its authority within the country. Moreover, we believe the regime will not be significantly impaired in its ability to arrive at policy decisions and carry them out effectively. These policies and their implementation will continue to reflect the fundamental agreement which evidently obtains among the leaders concerning the basic objectives of the Communist regime.

III. SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS

7. The appearance of new leadership in Moscow has had no apparent effect on the character of the relations between the USSR and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We believe that Soviet authority over the Satellite regimes will remain intact during the period of this estimate. The existence of widespread political discontent and serious difficulties in building up the Satellite economies will continue to delay the process of Sovietization of the area. However, during the next five years the Satellite contribution to Soviet power will gradually increase. Soviet control will continue to depend primarily on the presence

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or proximity of Soviet armed forces, and in the absence of general war popular dissatisfaction almost certainly will not develop beyond the stage of sporadic non-cooperation.

IV. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

8. The relations of the USSR with Communist China are markedly different from those prevailing between the USSR and any other Communist country. Communist China is more a Soviet ally than a Satellite. It possesses some capability for independent action, possibly even for action which the USSR might disapprove but which it would find difficult to repudiate. However, the main outlines of Communist policy in this area are probably jointly determined by Moscow and Peiping. While the Soviet voice presumably remains the dominant one, Communist China appears to be increasing its stature within the Sino-Soviet partnership. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy have recently given great emphasis to China's claim to an acknowledged position in international affairs, and the USSR has given evidence of a willingness to have Communist China assume greater responsibilities in furthering Communist interests in Asia. In particular Communist China seems to have an increasingly important role in the execution of Communist policy in North Korea and Indochina.

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9. The respective ambitions of the USSR and Communist China are in some cases conflicting, and constitute potential sources of friction between the two powers. We believe, however, that throughout the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces. The USSR and Communist China share a common ideology. Both of them regard the US as the chief obstacle to their objectives, and consider that their interests are threatened by US policy and power. Moreover, each partner profits at the present time from its alliance with the other. Communist China receives essential Soviet political, military, and economic support and assistance. Soviet leaders recognize in China a valuable ally, which provides the USSR not only military strength and defense in depth in the Far East, but also a base for further advancing Communist aims in Asia.

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11-5-54
19 May 1954V. SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH

10. The USSR has maintained its basic policy of forced-draft economic expansion throughout the postwar period, reaching approximately prewar levels of output in 1948 and steadily expanding in nearly every field since that time. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy, however, has declined in the past five years. From 1948 through 1950 Soviet GNP increased at an average annual rate of approximately 10 percent, but it fell off to about six or seven percent per annum in the three-year period 1950-1953 and is estimated to have been only about five percent in the year 1953. The unusually high rate of growth up through 1950 was the result of several factors, chief among which are: (a) the Soviet economy was still being reconstructed during the early period and hence capacity was brought into operation by comparatively little investment; (b) average growing conditions in agriculture were more favorable in 1949 and 1950 than in 1951 and 1953; and (c) the nonagricultural labor force grew less rapidly after 1950 than in the 1948-1950 period. In addition, the rate of growth in Soviet national product in 1953 was reduced as a result of the adjustments required by the revisions of economic plans introduced in that year.

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11. It is estimated that in the next two years the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will be about six or 6.5 percent per annum and that in the period 1956-1959 it will decline to about five or six percent per annum. The relatively higher rate of growth in the near term is expected to result from the resumption of a high rate of increase in total investment, including additional investment in the traditionally lagging sectors of the economy -- agriculture and consumers' goods industries. On the other hand, the rate of growth in the period 1956-1959 will be somewhat retarded, in part because of a decline in the growth of the labor force resulting from the low birth rate during World War II. Even so, the average annual growth rate for the entire period of this estimate will be nearly double the long-range average annual increase in GNP of the US economy of three percent and substantially above the annual increase of just over four percent which the US economy has shown in the 1948-1953 period.

12. Trends for the USSR determine the general character of economic growth rates for the whole Soviet Bloc.* Even though the rate of growth of Bloc GNP declines, this rate will almost certainly continue to exceed that of the US and NATO powers. The US-NATO growth rate for GNP is estimated to have been 2.8 percent per year during the first half of the twentieth century. If the latter rate should continue

* As used in this estimate the term Soviet Bloc includes all the East European Satellites (including East Germany), North Korea, and Communist China.

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throughout the period of this estimate, than the ratio of Soviet to US national products would increase from about 33 percent in 1953 to about 40 percent in 1959, and the ratio of Bloc to NATO national products would increase from about 38 percent to about 45 percent, respectively. However, the absolute difference between the total product of the Bloc and that of NATO (as well as between the USSR and the US) will be somewhat greater at the end of the period that it is at present.

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

13. The present regime in the USSR has not fundamentally changed the traditional Soviet economic policy of placing primary emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential. The new regime has, however, devoted a great deal of its attention and energies to a revision of current economic plans aimed at speeding up the production of agricultural commodities, especially foodstuffs, and manufactured consumers' goods. Soviet leaders have stated that this goal is to be achieved without decreasing the tempo of heavy industrial development, but they evidently intend, at least for the next two years, not to increase defense outlays above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953. This modification of Soviet economic programs is designed to overcome the lag in the growth of certain sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, and to bring about a better balanced economic growth over the long run.

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14. The promise of Soviet leaders to increase the volume of consumers' goods is being implemented by a serious effort to fulfill or modestly exceed the quotas in the existing five-year plan. If successful, the regime would thus reverse the persistent trend of recent years whereby this sector of the Soviet economy slipped well below planned levels as a result of the priority in the allocation of economic resources granted to heavy industry and defense production. The heart of the new economic program is the effort to increase agricultural output by: (a) providing greater incentives to the peasant population in the form of goods and payments; (b) channeling greater capital investment to agriculture in the form of mechanical draft power, machinery, fertilizer, and building materials; (c) providing the farms with an ample supply of qualified technicians; (d) improving farm organization and practices; and (e) bringing under cultivation vast areas of semiarid virgin land in the eastern USSR and central Asia.

15. An important concern of the Soviet regime is that the inadequacy of agricultural production has been a critical contributing factor in the slowdown in the rate of growth of Soviet industrial labor productivity. The Soviet Union has been getting more and more out of its industrial labor force each year, but the annual increases are getting smaller and smaller. The new economic program aims at increasing the urban supply of food and other consumer goods and --

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with this incentive for industrial workers -- steadily raising the level of labor productivity in Soviet industry. The new agricultural program of greater incentives and increased investment may mark the first step along lines of economic development that Soviet leaders will find it advisable to pursue for a number of years. They will almost certainly continue them through 1955 and in view of the likelihood that achievements will fall far short of plan goals, they may continue them during the whole period through 1959.

16. We believe that agricultural production is unlikely (even with normal weather) to increase by more than about three percent annually during the period 1954-1959, making a total increase of 15-20 percent for the whole period 1950-1959 as contrasted with the Five-Year Plan goal of about 50 percent increase for the period 1950-1955. Even so, the annual increment to the total Soviet gross national product will be large enough to permit moderate increases in standards of living and greater investment in enterprises producing consumers goods (including agriculture) without jeopardizing heavy industrial growth or the maintenance of a high level of military expenditure.

VII. EFFECT OF MODIFIED ECONOMIC PROGRAM ON SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES

17. We believe that if the new economic program is carried on as planned, Soviet defense expenditure will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955.

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Judging by the pattern of budgetary allotments, Soviet annual defense expenditure for 1954-1955 will be approximately the same as for 1952-1953, whereas it increased more than 50 percent between 1950 and 1952. We believe that Soviet defense outlays of all categories in 1953 amounted to about 13 to 16 percent of total Soviet GNP and that the proportion will slightly diminish for at least two or three years and possibly through mid-1959. In any case, over-all war potential will steadily increase as a result of the growth of the economy.

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VIII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES OF THE SOVIET BLOC

18. The USSR's consistently strong support to the development of science and technology has achieved, especially since World War II, a rapid increase in its capabilities in this area. However, the scientific assets of the US (the number and quality of trained personnel, facilities, equipment, and financial support) remain greater than those of the USSR, and the assets of the West as a whole are far greater than those of the Bloc. Soviet capabilities are sufficiently developed to provide effective support to industrial and military research and development. We believe that military requirements will continue to have a high priority in the allocation of Soviet scientific resources during the period of this estimate.

IX. MILITARY STRENGTH* AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS

19. In the postwar period the USSR has maintained its armed forces at high levels of strength and combat-readiness. During the period of this estimate military procurement, even if continued at the 1952-1953 rate, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement in weapons, equipment, and training, especially since large stockpiles will probably permit cutbacks in the production of some conventional armaments. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

* See Appendix for tables giving estimated strengths of Soviet Bloc ground, air, and naval forces.

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- a. An increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
- b. An increase in the capability to deliver these weapons;
- c. An increase in the long-range submarine force;
- d. An improvement in weapons systems for air defense.

Nuclear Weapons

20. For an estimate of the status of Soviet nuclear research and nuclear weapons stockpiles for the period 1954 through 1957, reference should be made to NIE 11-3A-54.

21. There is no evidence available which indicates the course that the Soviet atomic energy program will take during the period 1957 through 1959, nor are there any specific parameters which can be considered as limiting on the growth of the program during this period. Nevertheless, long-range extrapolations can be carried out on the basis of assumptions of the growth pattern the program might follow during the period in question.

22. Alternate assumptions, which indicate a range of growth capabilities are:

- a. No expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production facilities after 1957; or,

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- b. Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production facilities after 1957 at the same rate as estimated in NIE 11-3A-54 for the period 1954 to mid-1957; or
- c. Expansion of the Soviet program after 1957 at a rate which will increase its requirement for uranium to approximately 7,000 to 10,000 tons per year by 1964.

These alternate assumptions do not consider the possibility of rapid technological advances in the production of fissionable materials, nor do they reflect major advances in weapons development which must be anticipated. Developments in thermonuclear weapons with yields well in excess of one million tons of TNT, which could possibly be tested during 1954, could very substantially increase the total energy yield of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile. In addition, Soviet nuclear capabilities may be increased by weapon developments which will permit the adaptation of nuclear warheads to many delivery systems.

23. The Soviet fissionable materials stockpiles estimated for 1959 on the basis of above assumptions can be expressed in terms of weapon technology indicated by their 1953 tests. Examples of such conversion follow:

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1959	Assumption A	Assumption B	Assumption C
(1) Unboosted weapons 40 KT each	1,250	1,355	1,700
Total yield (million tons TNT)	50.	54.	68.
OR			
(2) Boosted U-235 1,000 KT each	132	145	168
Boosted FU 60 KT each	350	375	510
Boosted FU 5 KT each	1,050	1,125	1,525
Total yield (million tons TNT)	158.	172.	206.

Jet Bombers*

24. The USSR is giving high priority to development of medium and heavy jet bombers. A four-engine swept-wing jet bomber, designated the Type-37 for intelligence purposes, was observed in flight during the May Day show in 1954. This is an aircraft of about 310,000 pounds gross weight, with a length of approximately 155 feet and

* The data presented in paragraphs 24 and 25 is extremely tentative. All figures are based on preliminary and incomplete analysis of the photographic and other evidence available. Full analysis of available intelligence on these aircraft is currently under way. Integration of all available information on Soviet bombers, both development and operational use, will not be completed until early in June 1954.

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a wing span of about 170 feet, and with engines of _____ pound thrust. Based on preliminary evaluation of photographs, this aircraft is believed to be in the _____ knot speed class and to have a combat radius/range on the order of _____ / _____ nautical miles with a 10,000 pound load. We believe that a few of these aircraft will be in operational units by mid-1956 and about 50 by mid-1957.

25. Nine medium jet bombers were observed in flight during the May Day show of 1954. This two-engine aircraft, designated for intelligence purposes as the Type-39, is tentatively estimated to have a length of about 118 feet, a wing span of approximately 146 feet, and gross weight of around 165,000 pounds. Preliminary analysis of the photographs indicates that this aircraft is probably equipped with engines of the same type as the Type-37 and that it falls in the _____ knot speed class. Its combat radius/range is believed to be on the order of _____ / _____ nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load. It is estimated that about 20 of these aircraft will be in operational units by mid-1954.

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Guided Missiles*

26. The USSR has tested and possibly improved German World War II models of guided missiles and we have many indications that the USSR is devoting great effort to developing such missiles. We have no firm evidence that the USSR has any guided missiles ready for operational use at the present time. From an assessment of over-all Soviet technical capability, and assuming reasonable progress in Soviet programs based on the World War II German effort, we believe that the USSR could within the period of this estimate have considerable numbers of guided missiles in operational use. The type and characteristics of the missiles produced would depend upon the Soviet assessment of their military requirements and upon the allocation of priority among possible types.

27. We believe that it will not be within Soviet capability before 1959 to attack continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory. In 1959, it would be possible for the USSR to produce, for operational use, a pilotless-aircraft type of missile which could reach the US from Bloc territory; we have no evidence of such development now being under way. Before this time, however, the USSR could attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-range aircraft or from submarines.

* Detailed studies of this subject are currently under way and will provide the basis for NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in the Field of Guided Missiles," scheduled for production in the third quarter of 1954.

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Air Defense Weapons

28. At present, the USSR does not have an interception capability sufficient to prevent effective bombardment missions under poor visibility conditions. However, an all-weather fighter equipped with AI radar is probably a priority project of Soviet weapons development. It is expected that about 500 such aircraft will be in operational use by mid-1956 and about 2,000 by mid-1959. With the all-weather fighters available in greater numbers starting about mid-1958, along with a growing surface-to-air missile capability, it is expected that Soviet Bloc air defense capabilities will be improved substantially by 1959.

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XI. PROBABLE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET POLICY

29. In making their estimate of the world strategic situation Soviet leaders probably calculate that: (a) the US is irreconcilably hostile to the Soviet system and is intent on the formation of a world-wide anti-Communist coalition; (b) the US will meet increasing problems in attempting to create and give military substance to such a coalition; (c) frustration of this effort might lead the US either to adopt a policy of isolation or to undertake preventive war; (d) fears of nuclear warfare, particularly as Soviet air capabilities grow, will induce pressure in the US for avoidance of war with the USSR; (e) the continuing conflict with the US can be restricted to areas and issues involving less than an all-out military effort, in which case the USSR will eventually triumph.

30. The Kremlin probably considers that there is at present a rough strategic equilibrium between the Soviet Bloc and the US/NATO coalition. On the one hand, Western strength in conventional forces has grown and the US has retained its superior nuclear capabilities while improving its defensive posture. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, while retaining its strength in ground forces, has built an air force capable of using nuclear weapons in attacks on US allies, US forward air bases, and even -- under comparatively difficult

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operational circumstances -- in attacks on the continental US.

Soviet leaders probably believe that neither side can certainly win a war, but that each side is steadily increasing the number of ways in which it could cripple the other.

31. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to estimate the relative military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc and the US/NATO coalition substantially as described above. On this basis, the Kremlin probably would conclude that the USSR should try to during this period avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. The Kremlin will, however, probably continue to consider general war a possibility that cannot be excluded, and the USSR will almost certainly continue to build up its military and economic strength against this eventuality. We believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counter-action against an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security.

32. The Soviet leaders show no indication of feeling that the present balance of world power is unfavorable to their basic strategic interests. The Kremlin will try to foster and exploit political weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist nations and political or economic conflicts among

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them. They probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying the political warfare needle dexterously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances without substantial risk of general war. Meanwhile, they will almost certainly continue to devote great effort to building up better balanced economic and military strength in the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

33. It is impossible to estimate whether the Kremlin will continue its present policy through the whole period through 1959. The Soviet courses of action will depend primarily on the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase US aversion to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to promote its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. In the latter part of the period, the USSR will increasingly be ready to apply heavier pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. This pressure would be based on Soviet military strength -- used positively as a threat and negatively as a deterrent -- and it would be aimed at immobilizing the US and its allies while the USSR tried

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by political infiltration, subversion, and perhaps by local armed aggression, to undermine non-Communist nations one by one. On the other hand, if the US and its allies are determined, strong, and united, we believe the chances are better than even that Soviet leaders will maintain their present policies roughly unchanged through the period of this estimate.

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33. (Substitute) The Kremlin may continue to follow generally along its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate. However, the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. As these Soviet capabilities increase, the US is losing a great advantage which it has heretofore held in the struggle. Unless defensive capabilities develop beyond the degree now foreseen, both the US and the USSR will within the period of this estimate obtain sufficient nuclear capabilities to cripple each other, though only at grave risk of receiving crippling blows in return.

34. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and of its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. It may employ the threat of nuclear devastation as an instrument of political warfare. It may attempt to gain some of its objectives by local military actions, calculating that the US and its allies will be more anxious than before to keep such local conflicts from expanding into general war. It will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world

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upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. On the other hand, we believe that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

Chinese Communist Courses of Action

35. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. Communist China, mainly because of the narrow margin of its available resources over minimum domestic requirements, is likely to be reluctant to undertake foreign enterprises involving substantial risks of general war. On the other hand, Communist China would probably counter with military force any action it considers to be an imminent threat to Chinese Communist security.

36. Recent Communist successes in Indochina may predispose the Chinese Communists to press their advantage in Southeast Asia. If all or most of Indochina should fall under Communist control

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without the open intervention of Chinese Communist military forces having been required, the Chinese Communist leaders might feel that they could safely make strenuous efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections. In the absence of effective and united non-Communist resistance, both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders might take greater risks in this area of the world than in any other, not only because of the comparative vulnerability of Southeast Asia to political and military pressure but even more because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies concerning Far Eastern policy.

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APPENDIX

TABLES OF MILITARY STRENGTH

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**ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC
GROUND FORCES MID-1954 AND MID-1956/MID-1959**

COUNTRY	Line Divisions by Type, Mid-1954					Total Line Divisions	
	RIFLE	MECH	TANK	SUPPORT	OTHER	MID-1954	MID-1956-1959
USSR	110 ^{1/}	40	25	45 ^{2/}	--	175	175
Occupied Europe	5	16	9	13	--	30	30
West, USSR	41	9	8	--	26	84	84
Caucasus	9	2	0	--	6	17	17
Central USSR	9	1	0	--	4	14	14
Far East	16	6	2	--	6	30	30
Satellites (total)	63 ^{3/}	13	6	--	--	82	93
Albania	3 ^{4/}	--	-	--	--	3	3
Bulgaria	12 ^{4/}	--	2	--	--	14	16
Czechoslovakia	8	4	2	--	--	14	14
East Germany	4 ^{4/}	3	-	--	--	7	12
Hungary	12 ^{4/}	1	1	--	--	14	14
Poland	12 ^{5/}	5	-	--	--	17	19
Rumania	12 ^{5/}	-	1	--	--	13	15
Communist China	160	0	5	22	--	165	139
North Korea	19	0	0	0	--	19	24
Viet Minh	6	0	0	1	--	6	6

- 1/ This includes 5 cavalry divisions
 2/ Includes 20 artillery and 25 AAA divisions
 3/ Includes 2 cavalry divisions and 2 mountain divisions
 4/ Includes 1 cavalry division
 5/ Includes 2 mountain divisions

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SOVIET BLOC NAVAL FORCES^{1/}

TYPE	MID-1954	MID-1956	MID-1959
Battleships (Old)	3	3	3
Monitors (Old)	1	1	1
Cruisers (Modern)	23	24	29
Cruisers (Old)	2 ^{2/}	4 ^{3/}	53 ^{3/}
Destroyers (Modern)	129 ^{2/}	153 ^{3/}	183 ^{3/}
Destroyers (Old)	7	7	15
Coastal Destroyers (Modern)	37	65	100
Coastal Destroyers (Old)	15	15	15
Submarines			
Long-Range	148 ^{4/}	240	378
Medium-Range	73	73	73
Coastal	142	142	142

----- (These will not change substantially during the period of this estimate.)

Patrol Vessels	1,150
Mine Vessels	530
Amphibious Vessels	35
Auxiliaries	225

^{1/} The table gives Soviet vessels only. The European Satellite and Communist Chinese contributions to total Bloc naval strength will continue to be of minor importance, probably comprising about 5 to 10 old destroyers, several old submarines, and 300 minor surface vessels.

^{2/} Up to six may be Destroyer Leaders (DL)

^{3/} Up to 12 may be Destroyer Leaders (DL)

^{4/} About 65 of these represent two new types developed since World War II.

They are fitted with snorkel and other modern equipment, and have operating radii in excess of 6,000 miles. The building rate of these types is estimated at 46 per year.

NOTE: Possible Capital Ship (type unknown) may be added mid-1957.

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ESTIMATED AIR ARM STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, MID-1974-MID-1979

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	MID-1954			MID-1955		MID-1956		MID-1957		MID-1958		MID-1959 ^{1/}	
	USSR	EE SAT	CCAF/ NKAF	USSR	USSR	EE SAT	NCAF/ NKAF	USSR	USSR	USSR	EE SAT	NCAF/ NKAF	
Fighter: Jet (Day)	10,480	1,820	1,150	10,400	10,200	2,450	1,700	9,800	9,400	8,900	2,500 ^{2/}	2,300	
(All Weather)	20	--	--	200	500	--	--	1,000	1,500	2,100	--	--	
Piston	--	250	400	--	--	--	100	--	--	--	--	--	
Attack: Jet	--	--	--	200	900	100	40	1,600	2,100	2,300	400	100	
Piston	2,500	800	240	2,300	1,600	840	360	900	400	200	600	400	
Bomber: Jet	2,700	60	280	3,200	3,200	280	320	3,200	3,200	3,200	600	500	
Piston	500	300	320	--	--	310	200	--	--	--	100	--	
Med. Bomber: Jet	20	--	--	120	250	--	--	400	500	600	--	--	
Piston	1,270	--	10	1,080	850	--	70	550	400	250	30	100	
Heavy Bomber: Jet	--	--	--	--	Few	--	--	50	150	250	--	--	
Turbo-Prop	10	--	--	100	200	--	--	300	250	200	--	--	
Tankers: ^{3/} Medium	150	--	--	300	500	--	--	490	600	600	--	--	
Heavy	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	60	150	250	--	--	
Transport: ^{4/} Medium	--	--	--	--	50	--	--	100	200	400	--	--	
Light	1,900	150	120	1,900	1,850	180	170	1,800	1,700	1,500	270	250	
Helicopters	50	--	--	100	300	--	--	450	450	450	--	--	
Reconnaissance: Jet	500	--	--	750	900	70	--	1,000	1,070	1,070	200	--	
Piston	600	160	--	350	200	170	--	100	30	30	100	--	
TOTALS	20,700	3,550	2,520	21,000	21,500	4,400	2,960	21,800	22,100	22,300	4,800	3,650	
JETS	13,700	1,880	1,430	15,950	16,150	2,900	2,020	17,050	17,920	18,420	3,700	2,900	
BLOC TOTAL (FORM)		26,770		--		28,860		--	--		30,750		
Jets		17,010		--		21,070		--	--		25,020		
BLOC TOTAL (ACTUAL)		21,700		--		--		--	--		--		
Jets		12,500		--		--		--	--		--		

Footnotes on next page.

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FOOTNOTES

- 1/ NOTE: a. Figures include Naval Air.
- b. USSR figures are estimates of authorized TO & E strength, except in the categories showing introduction of new aircraft types, in which cases the build-up phase in new types represents estimated actual strength. Present actual strength is estimated to be, for the various types of aircraft, the following percentages of TO & E strength: Jet fighters-80 percent; Piston fighters-90/100 percent; Attack-95/100 percent; Jet light bombers-60 percent; Piston light bombers-95/100 percent; Piston medium bombers-82/87 percent; Transport-90/95 percent; Jet reconnaissance 60 percent; Piston reconnaissance-90/95 percent. Based on present reequiment trends, it is considered that the over-all operational establishment will be at a figure close to full authorized strength by mid-1955. The possible effect which introduction of guided missiles might have on aircraft strength in the latter part of the period cannot presently be estimated.
- c. Actual over-all strength of European Satellite Air Forces is estimated at about 65 percent of authorized strength in mid-1954, at 75 percent for mid-1956, and 85 percent for mid-1959.
- d. Actual strength of the CCAF-UKAF is about 75 percent of authorized strength in mid-1954, at 85 percent for mid-1956, and 90 percent for mid-1959.
- 2/ May include approximately 300 all-weather fighters.
- 3/ Tankers have not been identified in operational units nor have inflight refueling techniques. The estimate presented represents the numbers of aircraft which could be supported if tankers operations were introduced.
- 4/ In addition to Transports, it is estimated that 300 gliders are in organized glider regiments.

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